Journal of Agrarian Change, Vol. 4 No. 4, October 2004, pp. 461–491.

Restructuring and Redundancy: The Impacts and Illogic of Neoliberal Agricultural Reforms in Jamaica

TONY WEIS

Since the onset of IMF lending in the late 1970s, Washington-based planners have progressively compelled the Jamaican state to abandon its role in agriculture. Jamaica's agricultural adjustment occurred in two stages: first, agricultural development programmes were rolled back in the 1980s; second, liberalizing pressures in the 1990s threatened both the uncompetitive plantation sector (imperilling preferential markets) and domestically oriented small farmers (initiating a flood of cheap food imports). Today, agriculture in Jamaica is on the brink of irrelevance, with serious social and economic consequences in the balance. In critically assessing the process, impacts and illogic of agricultural restructuring in Jamaica, this paper highlights the uneven outcomes of global market integration and points to the urgent need for a reassertion of local sovereignty.

Keywords: Jamaica, structural adjustment, trade liberalization, food imports

ASSUMING AWAY THE SUPERFLUOUS PEASANTRY

Many have noted how large segments of the world's population are becoming structurally 'irrelevant' as a result of global market integration coupled with the soaring and highly uneven productivity of industrial capitalism. In no sector are the consequences graver than in agriculture. As the integration of the global food economy deepens, with comparative advantage heavily conditioned by vast disparities in the scale, technology, and subsidization of production, and the enormous influence of transnational corporations (TNCs) on consumers and producers,[1] profound concerns have arisen about the future of peasants in developing countries in the face of rising competitive pressures.

Tony Weis, Department of Geography, University of Western Ontaris, London, Ontaris, Canada. e-mail: anthonyweis@hotmail.com

The author thanks the Inter-American Institute for Co-operation on Agriculture (Canadian office), the International Development Research Council of Canada, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for funding at different stages of this research; the many people in Jamaica who have aided his work there; and Henry Bernstein for helpful comments and suggestions.

[1] This entails everything from their marketing machinery conditioning dietary aspirations, to their ability, through global sourcing patterns, to dictate regional specializations and homogenize production conditions.

Amin (2003) paints a stark picture of the disparities in global agricultural production and the social fallout for the three billion people whose livelihood is still tied to peasant farming. As markets are increasingly dominated and prices depressed by supplies from a few tens of millions of very large-scale, mechanized and productive farmers in temperate regions, and a more populous (but still relatively small) upper stratum of farmers in the developing world with access to fertilizers, pesticides, enhanced seeds, irrigation, mechanization and good land, the vast majority of small-scale peasants in Asia, Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean are faced with eroding margins and outright exclusion. This polarization, if it continues, portends a social convulsion on an almost unimaginable scale. As Amin (2003, 3) asks: 'what would happen to those billions of people?' (recognizing that, 'in fifty years' time, industrial development, even in the fanciful hypothesis of a continued growth rate of seven percent annually, could not absorb even one-third of this reserve').

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have played a critical role in these polarizing and integrating processes, as structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) have compromised national sovereignty over agriculture across most of the developing world, cutting state programmes, intensifying a policy framework favouring large-scale exporters and opening domestic markets. In 1995, bilateral pressures for integration were augmented by the multilateral regulation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). According to the logic of these institutions, comparative advantage should define production patterns globally, arbitrated by an integrated (ostensibly neutral) market, which will optimize the efficiency of the system as a whole, bringing widespread benefits in the form of cheaper and more stable supplies of goods.

The belief that an integrated market should govern the development or decline of economic sectors everywhere reflects a sort of faith sometimes referred to as 'market fundamentalism', with inevitable dislocations assumed away in the claim that capital and labour will gravitate to more competitive sectors. As the contradictory tensions of this expansionary project are greatest in agriculture, examining the process of agricultural restructuring in different settings provides critical insights into the economic architecture governing neoliberal globalization.

Jamaica provides a good window to assess this restructuring process, as adjustment has left its agricultural sector in deep crisis, with global pressures threatening to render both its plantation and small farm production redundant. Jamaica's sugar and banana plantations – which, together with large pastures, dominate the fertile coastal plains – are highly inefficient, and have been kept afloat by endangered preferential markets. Small farmers account for most domestic production and some exports, while having been historically confined to small, steep plots in the rugged interior,[2] and the burden of their colonial inheritance has been

[2] Eighty per cent of Jamaica is hilly limestone or is mountainous with slopes over 15 degrees, and over half the island has slopes in excess of 20 degrees. Four per cent of landholders control 65 per cent of Jamaica's agricultural land, while 96 per cent of landholders control only 35 per cent, mostly in small, hillside farms averaging 0.83 ha (SIOJ 1998). These inequities are magnified by the widespread insecurity of tenure and differential land and infrastructure quality and access to irrigation.

intensified by withering state support and a wave of imported food. Jamaica's agricultural crisis is reflected in a soaring agro-trade deficit; from a near balance in the early 1990s, agro-exports now equal only 60 per cent of agro-imports.

This paper examines how Washington-directed policy reforms have eroded the viability of Jamaican agriculture. It begins by reviewing first, Jamaica's agricultural landscape, and second, its general experience with structural adjustment. The analysis of agricultural policy change draws on government and World Bank documents, academic analyses and interviews with key participants in various government capacities and in non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The impacts of adjustment on agriculture are initially set within the broader decline of the productive economy. Next, the future of plantation production is assessed with respect to the threats to preferential markets, while the impact of liberalization on domestic markets is explored through trade, production and consumption patterns together with insights from government, NGO and private sector participants. The distortions associated with new market pressures are indicated by contrasting levels of state support for agriculture between Jamaica and the USA, the primary source of rising imports.

Ultimately, the intention is to not only provide a critique of the process of neoliberal agricultural restructuring, but to point towards a case for reclaiming national sovereignty over agriculture from the market, and the final section sketches some urgent alternatives – because contrary to the prevailing economic logic, there is nothing inevitable about the decline of agriculture in Jamaica.

THE CONTEXT OF AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN JAMAICA

Modernization and 'De-peasantization'

Originally constructed to serve European demand for sugar with a brutalized African slave labour force, Jamaican agriculture has long been embedded in international trade. Jamaica's landscape still bears the scars of the most ferocious form of agricultural production ever devised, as plantations kept their vice-like grip on the best land after Emancipation in 1838,[3] with all subsequent distribution programmes only ever acting on the margins of these inhumanly constructed yet sacrosanct institutions (Weis 2004). While newly constituted peasants were thus forced to marginal interior lands, the resilience of the emergent peasantry was such that it became the 'backbone' of post-slavery Jamaican society. A middle stratum of commercialized farmers emerged over time, but the basic peasant–plantation divide remained at the heart of the island's historical development (Beckford and Witter 1991).

In 1950, Jamaica was still an agriculture-based society – 80 per cent of the population was rural, agriculture provided two in five jobs and sugar remained the dominant export. Import dependence was high and local industry minimal,

[3] Britain officially abolished slavery in its colonies in 1833, but slavery persisted in a transitional form until 1838.

consisting of some sugar and rum manufacturing, a few small agro-processors and small-scale handicraft production. However, with mechanization envisaged for sugar, widespread poverty amongst the land-starved peasantry and unemployment and population pressures rising, economic planning shifted towards industrialization, mirroring the counsel of Nobel Prize-winning West Indian economist Sir Arthur Lewis.[4]

By some measures, this approach was successful in Jamaica for a time. Foreign investment spurred the growth of bauxite, tourism and branch-plant manufacturing, and real per capita GDP grew 3–4 per cent annually between 1950 and 1962. Shortly after independence in 1962, agro-exports had fallen to less than two-fifths of total exports (Thomas 1988), and the process of 'de-peasantization' was underway, part of major social change in the region. Governing elites saw the declining significance of agriculture as an inevitable part of modernization, something they had little ability or desire to affect. But while the boom of the 1950s and 1960s brought some diversification and much new wealth, benefits flowed heavily along the unequal course set by colonialism, import dependence deepened, foreign control extended into new realms and the economy remained poorly integrated. The inequities and vulnerabilities of this path fuelled progressive popular and intellectual currents and helped bring a populist leader, Michael Manley, to power in 1972.

Like most developing countries, Jamaica was hit hard by the oil price shock in the early 1970s, as soaring import costs brought major payments deficits. This vulnerability contributed to the leftward turn of Manley's Peoples National Party (PNP) government, which was marked by its nationalization of the bauxite industry. Other nationalizations and social commitments ensued and, in sharp contrast to the preceding decades, agriculture was seen to have an important role in absorbing rather than shedding labour and mitigating payments deficits, through both exports and by increased import substitution. To demonstrate this importance, Manley named himself Minister of Agriculture.

Agricultural Policy in the 1970s: From a Fleeting Priority to the IMF

The PNP's plan to enhance domestic agriculture was called 'Operation GROW' ('Growing and Reaping Our Wealth'), and included a land settlement initiative called Project Land Lease. Between 1973 and 1980, roughly 36,000 small farmers (many formerly landless) gained access to 30,000 ha (70,000 acres) of land through extendable leases, with tenants supported by credit, inputs and extension (Augustin 1992). Another key initiative was the establishment of the state-run Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC) to overcome small farmers' dependence on inconsistent higglers (petty traders) and the production bottlenecks that resulted,

[4] Lewis (1950) called for 'industrialization by invitation', assuming that foreign investment would facilitate the transfer of technology and skills needed to develop a competitive, labour-absorbing, export-oriented manufacturing sector. Interestingly, Lewis had originally advocated for radical land reform and an equitable peasant sector as the foundation for regional development.

and the AMC significantly improved the scale and consistency of marketing for small farmers.

The PNP's small farm-oriented policies also included efforts to improve tenure security, access to credit, research and extension services and rural infrastructure, and a series of cooperatives ('Pioneer Farms') was established to give unemployed youth theoretical and hands-on agricultural training (Newman and Le Franc 1994; Augustin 1992). These policies brought some successes, notably rising domestic food production (by 10–20 per cent between 1977 and 1979) and employment (between 1977 and 1980 agriculture accounted for 36–39 per cent of employment) (Anderson and Witter 1994).

Small farmers' gains were, however, limited by the fact that Land Lease primarily involved marginal lands (Augustin 1992; McBain 1992). Rather than pursuing more substantial land reform, the PNP chose to transform the sugar industry, turning state-held estates[5] into cooperatives in 1974, and subsequently approving the formation of more worker cooperatives while nationalizing sugar factories (Stone 1992). The ailing sugar and banana sectors had been given a new lease on life by the Lomé Convention (1975),[6] which secured access to European markets at a time of severe foreign exchange shortfalls and made it difficult to consider restructuring the export base.

Despite the success of small farm-oriented policies and the commitments to restructure worker–management relations on plantations, their momentum was short-lived, overwhelmed by a combination of growing economic and political pressures that pushed the PNP towards the IMF. Though he won a convincing electoral victory in 1976 on a platform of democratic socialism, Manley soon lost confidence in that course. Mounting payments deficits were the most pressing problem, and in 1977 Manley rejected a commissioned plan for a transition to socialism (at the heart of which was to be a programme of radical land reform, with the transformation of agriculture envisioned as the foundation for economic and social change) for an IMF loan bringing balance of payments support. Another stabilization loan came in 1978, and with this funding Jamaica got an early dose of the IMF conditionalities, initially focused on spending cuts, that became so widespread in the developing world (Weis forthcoming).

IMF fiscal targets and the economic crisis of the time together bled the vitality out of the PNP's agricultural development policies. The food production gains noted earlier were largely the residual product of previous changes, and as promised supports were withdrawn from Land Lease (McBain 1992) and vastly insufficient investment (e.g. efficiency improvements, work education) went into developing sugar cooperatives at their formative stage (Stone 1992), their

[5] The previous administration had bailed out British sugar giant Tate and Lyle in 1971, acquiring some of the island's biggest estates, but before these could be subdivided and sold to large farmers, as was planned, the PNP took power.

[6] Lomé followed on earlier arrangements between Britain and France and former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP), securing non-reciprocal, duty-free access and stable prices for most ACP exports to the European Community.

prospects dimmed. In short, as in many developing countries, when the structural imbalances of global trade patterns worsened, the sovereignty of Jamaica's development planning began yielding to international financial institutions.

Development Planning Moves North

Jamaica's economy continued to deteriorate in the late 1970s, and Manley lost the 1980 elections to Edward Seaga of the conservative, ironically named Jamaican Labour Party (JLP). Seaga readily looked to Washington for help with Jamaica's payments imbalances, negative investment climate and capital flight, and received continued stabilization loans from the IMF, as well as three World Bank Structural Adjustment Loans between 1982 and 1984. These loans brought the standard interlocking conditionalities of state budget austerity, the liberalization of trade and interest and exchange rates, investment deregulation, reductions of real wage levels and the establishment of export-processing zones, though privatization was withheld at first.

Significant economic growth occurred in the early 1980s, owing partly to increased investment in tourism, export processing (primarily garment sweatshops) and financial services, but also to a dramatic rise in development assistance and lending-fuelled, elite-dominated consumption. But by 1984 growth had stalled, unemployment was rising and the payments imbalances that had compelled Jamaica into the IMF's embrace were getting worse not better. Early failures only intensified the prescription, as growing trade deficits and debt service costs brought more loans and more conditionalities from the IMF, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) – the infamous 'borrowing treadmill' that was so pivotal in the emerging hegemony of the 'Washington Consensus' in the 1980s (Weis forthcoming; Anderson and Witter 1994).

As Jamaican policy-making effectively moved from Kingston to Washington, the social commitments of the 1970s were largely undone and agriculture went from being a relative priority – underpinned by a belief that the state had an important role in the sector's development, and that the decline of agricultural employment could and should be reversed – to the margins. State participation in agriculture was rolled back in two stages; first, development programmes were slashed in the 1980s; and second, flexibility to intervene in markets was restricted in the 1990s. The assumption was that market incentives would either revive agriculture or 'release' the 'excess' capital and labour it contained to more competitive economic sectors, come what may to agricultural production.

Associated with this prescription is a theory in which free markets and specialization are professed to enhance food security. In essence, developing countries are seen to be acting 'irrationally' if they support or protect uncompetitive food production, as liberalization ensures cheaper and more stable food supplies while concentrating on comparatively advantaged export sectors maximizes a nation's ability to generate foreign exchange and hence to purchase more food than could be produced. The application of this theory, policy and practice in Jamaica is now considered in more detail.

THE PROCESS OF AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN JAMAICA

Adjustment Part I: Rolling Back State Programmes

> . . . de IMF a de tiefingest ting – dem lend you money fi buy tin mackerel, but not fi help small farmers plant. Every country where dem go it mash up. (Small farmer in St. Mary, Jamaica[7])

Structural adjustment quickly undid most of the agricultural development initiatives of the 1970s under the auspices of the JLP government's 'AGRO-21' plan. Designed with assistance from USAID, AGRO-21 reflected the IMF-World Bank prescription of private sector-led, export-oriented restructuring, abandoning concern about import substitution and small farm development, cutting state programmes and focusing remaining resources on middle- and large-scale exporters.

In Jamaica, as elsewhere, the most striking part of agricultural adjustment was what it ignored; as Berry notes, the IMF and World Bank have consistently avoided the 'most important of all desirable "structural adjustments"' (1997, 11) – that is land reform, sanctioning grossly inequitable property rights and de-legitimizing the state's role in redistribution. Even after World Bank authors and publications began citing the economic theory on the inverse relationship between farm size and productivity in the 1980s, acknowledging the economic and social benefits of a small farm landscape, actual policies failed to support redistributive land reform, as is seen clearly in Jamaica.[8]

Land Lease, which had focused on the poor (albeit on marginal lands), was replaced by a land distribution policy that emphasized the sale of large tracts (over 9000 acres) of public lands. This reflected the planner's preference for private property over leasehold and cooperative arrangements and their vision of the commercial development of non-traditional agro-exports, which was a popular World Bank and USAID goal for developing countries. This new approach to land distribution reduced access to land for the poor at a time when 71 per cent of all farms still occupied only 12 per cent of Jamaica's agricultural land (Beckford 1985).

The Pioneer Farms were de-mobilized, as part of massive cutbacks to training, research and extension services, while the demise of the consistent and high-volume AMC gave higglers back their dominant role in domestic marketing,

[7] This and subsequent quotes from small farmers come from fieldwork in eastern Jamaica conducted by the author over a 10-month period in 2001–2 (Weis 2003).

[8] Eventually, the World Bank's theoretical commitment to 'capitalist development from below', or 'peasant capitalism', came to be reflected in some places (especially Latin America) in its support for market-led land reforms, which have been widely critiqued for privileging big peasants and creating new forms of unevenness. Byres (2004a, 2004b) deconstructs the neo-populist, neo-classical economic logic that underlies both World Bank-style, market-led land reform and ostensibly more radical versions of state-directed redistributive land reform that champion small, private landholdings, idealize a world of perfect competition and deny the reality of peasant stratification. One of the pillars of this logic is the case for an inverse relationship between farm size and productivity which, Byres argues, fails to account for the productivity gains associated with capitalist agricultural transformation and technology.

with an assurance that the efficiency of the private sector would ensure higher farm-gate prices (though this system had long condemned small farmers to high levels of spoilage and unpredictability). The state monopoly over importing was eliminated, and most state export commodity boards were deregulated in the belief that they had 'grown beyond their optimal size, and their dominant role over export crops is not consistent with an export-led development strategy based on greater reliance on the private sector' (Government of Jamaica and National Planning Agency (GoJ/NPA) 1982, 7).

Between 1981 and 1985, government expenditure on agriculture as a percentage of GDP declined fourfold. This was not only due to a shrinking overall budget associated with debt and austerity; agricultural spending was also de-prioritized – in 1974–5, agriculture received over 19 per cent of government expenditure, but by 1990–1 this had fallen to less than 4 per cent (FAO 1995; Newman and LeFranc 1994; McBain 1992; Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) 1990). In an assessment oozing with hypocrisy, the World Bank (1994, 59) later complained that 'critical areas of support' are 'especially absent for small farmers' in Jamaica, calling this a major reason for their 'low productivity'.

Currency devaluation, which was expected to enhance exports as well as improve the competitiveness of domestic production vis-à-vis imports, also served to make agro-inputs and farm tools more costly, especially as subsidies shrank. Rising expenses were compounded by cuts to marketing and extension services, making it difficult for small farmers to benefit from price gains. In short, these changes did not improve the competitive position of small farmers vis-à-vis imports, and rising prices were passed on to consumers (FAO 1995; Newman and LeFranc 1994; McBain 1992).

The JLP eluded a notorious IMF food riot[9] through an emergency Food Assistance Programme (FAP) that included a Food Stamp Programme (1984), the reintroduction of some subsidies on basic foods (1986) and a School Feeding Programme (1986). Incredibly, the FAP was not intended to increase access to locally produced foods, and actually had the reverse impact; with subsidies focused on imported staples 'the bias in consumption habits toward foreign foods' was promoted by making it 'rational, from the point of view of households maximizing nutrient per dollar, to buy imported instead of local foods' (Witter 1989, 19). The small farmer's comment at the outset of this section brilliantly captures the perversity of loans facilitating imported consumption patterns as support to domestic producers evaporated.

As noted, most state funding that remained in agriculture went to promote exports. The foremost priorities were sugar and bananas, which included funds for improved roads, equipment, irrigation, inputs and debt write-off. Sugar workers' cooperatives – under-supported since their inception – were deemed a failure, and the state quickly took over management of the industry with the

[9] Devaluation, de-regulated markets and cuts to food subsidies often brought rapid increases to food prices in adjusting countries, and the burden of these price shocks on the poor often led to what became known as IMF food or bread riots.

goal of making state-owned plantations and factories attractive for privatization, which took longer than planned (divestment was later tied to loan conditions). For sugar workers, this brought a return to the status quo ante, as Stone described: 'the situation of worker powerlessness, labour exploitation, and rural proletarian squalor and poverty continues . . . under the management of a state-owned public enterprise' (1992, 100). The plan for the banana industry was to develop large, high-tech estates (GoJ/NPA 1982), and a small number of plantations came to dominate export production in the 1980s, squeezing out small farmers who had historically been active in banana exporting. But while state funding was focused on sugar and bananas, austerity limited its scale and any consequent efficiency gains, and private investments fell short of expectations. The development of non-traditional exports was also constrained by a shortage of capital.

Jamaica's agro-export earnings did grow in the 1980s, but this was mainly due to favourable prices for traditional exports in protected markets rather than on enhanced competitiveness.[10] Sugar volumes were stagnant throughout the 1980s, while banana volumes recovered from a precipitous decline in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Other exports did not take off as expected, with a few exceptions – most notably highland coffee, a longstanding minor export which now began a period of strong growth, and something not likely celebrated by IMF and World Bank planners, namely marijuana.

In short, adjustment intensified the old unevenness of the landscape, and the state virtually disappeared for small farmers. Agriculture's contribution to the national workforce began a sharp decline, falling to 28 per cent by the end of the 1980s. The decline in agricultural employment was hardly unexpected, and may be interpreted as an intended outcome of adjustment, as de-peasantization helped the competitiveness of new growth areas, where Jamaica's comparative advantage was seen to lie – mass tourism and sweatshop manufacturing – by expanding the pool of surplus labour and putting downward pressure on wages. While new opportunities did not keep pace with the scale of displacement, the social convulsions were mitigated somewhat by massive emigration; within a decade, roughly one in twelve Jamaicans left the country (Anderson and Witter 1994).

Because agriculture shed labour without efficiency gains, its productive capacity was eroded. And with the government unable to afford the cost of its food assistance programmes, 'the failure of the production system to produce sufficient food at affordable prices' presented serious food security concerns (Witter 1989, 2). These were interpreted in different ways. The *Jamaica Five-Year Development Plan 1990–95*, written following Manley's return to power in 1989, blamed massive cuts in government investment for the production problems in agriculture and the 'increasing dependence on imported food' (PIOJ 1990, 64). For

[10] Sugar prices received by ACP producers in Europe are well above world market prices as a result of the heavy subsidization of European beet sugar production. This has made for some very difficult political positions for the ACP at multilateral trade negotiations, where other developing countries view massive rich country subsidies as a detrimental force.

IMF-World Bank planners, however, what was needed was a harsher dose of adjustment, including a key element withheld throughout the 1980s – market liberalization.[11]

Given the severity of Jamaica's debt noose by this time (its ratio of debt service-to-exports nearly tripled during the 1980s, growing to 50 per cent), it is not surprising which vision won out, as the PNP soon negotiated another IMF loan. It also signed an Agricultural Sector Adjustment Loan (ASAL) with the World Bank in 1990, which marks the second phase of agricultural adjustment, concurrent with the escalation of economy-wide restructuring that included widespread privatizations.

Adjustment Part II: Intensifying Market Discipline

The government was finally able to privatize the sugar industry in 1993, when the Sugar Company of Jamaica (SCJ) – a consortium of Jamaican and British capital – acquired control over the largest state-held estates and factories. But neither the investment in the 1980s nor that from the privatized SCJ was sufficient, and less than five years after privatization the government bailed-out the failing SCJ, re-acquiring its assets, operations and momentous debts for J$1, along with other sugar factories that had gone bankrupt. Following this, the state owned or held in receivership six of the eight operating factories and major estates.

With development programmes rolled back in the 1980s, the last mechanism left to support small farmers' competitiveness was defensive, through tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs), but this protection shrank significantly in the 1990s, beginning with the ASAL. The World Bank would later frame liberalization as being essential to the region's prospects for 'long-term growth', as enhanced access to cheaper, better quality and more diverse goods was needed to 'increase the competitiveness of Caribbean exports and tourism' (Webb 1997, 9). Related to this was the belief that inefficient producers should no longer be protected (FAO 1995).

The ASAL planned 'to achieve structural adjustment of the agricultural sector' by helping Jamaica finance 'urgently needed imports required during such execution' (World Bank 1990, 1), a blatant statement of the import supported lending that was, as discussed, implicit in earlier IMF loans. Critically, the ASAL made Jamaica initiate 'a program, satisfactory to the Bank, for annual reduction in tariffs for imports of agricultural and agro-industrial products' (World Bank 1990, 16), and called for the conversion ('tariffication') of NTBs into stamp duties, a condition further embedded in Jamaica's second Trade and Financial Sector Adjustment Loan (1991). Thus, import licences became stamp duties with a timetable for reduction, with tariffs left as the main border instrument and also scheduled for reduction.

[11] Jamaica's small farmers had initially been spared liberalization because domestic production 'was considered to be a difficult sector in which to introduce international competitiveness' (FAO 1995, 18).

Another ASAL condition was to remove subsidies and controls from the Agricultural Credit Bank (World Bank 1990). When government officials complained that commercializing agricultural credit would make it inaccessible to small farmers, a World Bank team insisted this would imply that 'the market is telling you that agriculture is not the way to go for Jamaica' (quoted in McAfee 1993, 132). Such audacious counsel is not only myopic – as rich countries heavily subsidize credit for their farmers – but clearly ignored the myriad barriers small farmers confront in accessing capital as well as the social reality of a time when agriculture still employed nearly three in ten working Jamaicans.

In 1992, Jamaica signed an *Agricultural Sector Adjustment Programme Loan* with the IDB, allegedly to support agro-processing, but whose conditions included liberalizing imports of milk powder and various meats (Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 1992). In 1993, the *Private Sector Development Adjustment Loan* (PSDAL), signed with the World Bank, called for adjustments to Jamaica's 'policy, legal, and regulatory environment', once again 'providing assistance in the financing of urgently needed imports' during the reforms (World Bank 1993, 1). The PSDAL contained a further important conditionality for agriculture: the elimination of stamp duties on most food imports by 1995.

The impact of these conditionalities requiring agricultural liberalization was swift and pronounced, and is essential to understanding the implications of the WTO and ongoing trade negotiations. By the mid-1990s, the World Bank approvingly noted that across the Jamaican economy, the 'Common External Tariff (CET)[12] had been lowered from over 100 per cent in the late 1980s to a range of 5–35 per cent and most quantitative restrictions . . . were eliminated' (1996, 2). In terms of food imports specifically, duties that were well over 100 per cent in the 1980s, and augmented by NTBs, were reduced to between 0 and 40 per cent (the majority between 20 and 40 per cent), with NTBs eliminated. For the few sensitive products where the stamp duty was levied on top of customs tariffs, aggregate tariffs remained significantly higher. Further liberalization was expected, but as imports soared 'even the World Bank was admitting the pace is crazy', according to a Jamaican Ministry of Agriculture official, and agreed to slow down.

While the process of liberalization in Jamaica was directed from Washington, it also gained strength from certain domestic social and economic pressures. According to a Jamaican trade negotiator, liberalization was part of a 'deliberate policy to keep imports cheap' to avoid inflationary pressures associated with rising food costs. Containing inflation and maintaining macro-economic stability are key pillars of adjustment (to ensure investor confidence and attract foreign capital), and the Jamaican government has consistently claimed this as one of its top priorities and achievements since the mid-1990s (Weis forthcoming).

As noted, food security concerns were also pressing in the early 1990s, with many poor urban households struggling for food and 'seemingly entrenched in a

[12] Members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) have the CET for imported goods from non-CARICOM nations.

situation of daily survival' (Caribbean Food and Nutrition Institute 1994, 50). Thus, social pressures – magnified by the need to keep the volatile 'Kingston kettle' from erupting,[13] as the trade negotiator put it – added to external pressures for liberalization. An NGO representative insisted that the government's preoccupation with the needs of poor consumers supersedes any concern for small farmers, even if it means 'you are looking at the destruction of the rural economy'.

Another pressure for agricultural liberalization has come from Jamaica's historically powerful merchant class, which has long favoured trade over productive investment. Dubbing them 'captains of the Jamaican economy', a Member of Parliament suggested that 'there's a cadre of importers who control an inordinate influence in policy – they dominate a whole consciousness'. The interests of the merchant-importing class have been augmented by the importance of tourism, which became Jamaica's largest economic sector as a percentage of GDP in the 1980s. Given increasing international competition in tourism, tourists' expectations of international cuisine and the fact that food is the second biggest expense for large hotels, the attraction of cheap food imports to the tourism industry is obvious.

In short, Jamaica's swift agricultural liberalization resonated with a short-term conception of food security and powerful domestic interests, and the government further compromised its flexibility to intervene in markets by signing onto the WTO.

The WTO: Entrenching Liberalization and Threatening Preferences

While adjustment restricted how countries like Jamaica could intervene in domestic markets, global agriculture had been immune from multilateral discipline prior to the WTO's Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) in 1995. Forged by rich countries in the interests of their transnational agribusiness corporations, the AoA limits state sovereignty over agriculture in very uneven ways, sanctioning huge disparities in subsidization while entrenching commitments to liberalization.

Under the AoA, WTO members agreed to monitor and reduce export subsidies and so-called trade-distorting domestic supports (principally price support) according to specific schedules (the 'Amber Box') and to tariffy NTBs. Importantly, many other forms of subsidies (the 'Green Box') were called production neutral and not counted against reduction requirements, ensuring that rich nations could continue to subsidize their farm sectors heavily.[14] In

[13] Kingston annually records one the highest per capita rates of violent homicides in the world, which are concentrated in its sprawling ghetto communities. Weis (forthcoming) examines Jamaica's 'social implosion' in more detail.

[14] The Green Box includes state support for: research, pest and disease control, infrastructure, food aid programmes for domestic consumption, inspection services, marketing promotion, public stocking for food security, disaster relief, payments under environmental protection programmes, crop insurance schemes, decoupled income support and long-term development programmes in developing countries.

addition to the tariffication of NTBs (begun in Jamaica under loan conditionality), the AoA also limited government flexibility to intervene in markets by forcing nations to bind tariff ceilings.

With freedom to set tariff ceilings, many developing countries – including Jamaica and CARICOM[15] – did so at relatively high levels, having been marginal to the negotiating process and with few policy tools left after their developmentalist energies had been 'SAPed' by the IMF and World Bank. CARICOM's CET for food imports was previously set at 40 per cent, but CARICOM negotiators bound it at 100 per cent under the WTO. However, setting high tariff ceilings did not prevent liberalization from deepening in a subtle way, through the standardization of tariff measurement. Jamaica had been levying tariffs based on the estimated market price of an item – the Brussels Definition of Value – but under the WTO system (which came into effect in Jamaica in 2001) tariffs are levied on the cheaper invoice price at the border. Another danger in the long run is that binding set a vulnerable target for future negotiations, as the tariff ceiling is the last measure Jamaica has left to negotiate with (discussed below).

In short, even while the AoA did not force Jamaica to cut tariffs faster than IMF-World Bank demands, the AoA's tariff ceiling plus the abolition of NTBs significantly restricted future flexibility for market intervention. To observe this loss of flexibility, it is instructive to consider that in the late 1980s, Jamaica's agro-tariffs averaged over 100 per cent and could be supplemented with NTBs. Further, even if tariffs were enforced at the same level, their effective impact declined after 2001 with the new measurement. Finally, although the WTO allows some short-term protections, such as anti-dumping measures, countervailing duties and emergency safeguards, the limited institutional capacity for monitoring and legal enforcement in nations like Jamaica must be recognized.

The WTO had an even more pronounced impact on Jamaica's banana and sugar prospects, threatening vital preferential markets. In 1995, the US (on behalf of the Chiquita, Dole and Del Monte corporations) and the leading Latin American banana exporters successfully argued to the WTO that the EU-ACP banana regime was an unfair trade practice, a decision affirmed on appeal in 1998.[16] After much legal wrestling, the matter was closed when the Lomé Agreement was renegotiated in Cotonou, Benin in 2000 to phase out quotas for ACP bananas by 2006, an arrangement that was upheld at the WTO's Doha

[15] Given their small size, limited resources and similar interests, CARICOM nations negotiate as a group and are informed by a shared Regional Negotiating Machinery, though they retain some individual flexibility in making commitments.

[16] The impact of this challenge has been most dramatic in St Lucia, St Vincent and Dominica, where protected markets had fostered extreme dependence on bananas. The flipside of this dependence was that favourable terms of trade together with a fairly equitable smallholder system had widely improved standards of living, in contrast to the legacy of slave wages, workers poisoned by agricultural chemicals and the connection between US capital and corrupt, dictatorial regimes associated with banana production in Latin America.

Ministerial in 2001. The Cotonou Agreement maintained the EU-ACP sugar market until 2008 (also sanctioned at Doha), after which time liberalization will be phased-in to become WTO-compatible. With a patchwork of preferential agreements governing most of the world trade in sugar, future WTO negotiations or the current WTO legal challenge from low-cost producers Brazil, Australia and Thailand could bring major changes to the system.

THE DECLINE AND UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF JAMAICAN AGRICULTURE

Becoming a 'Consuming Appendage'

In order to assess the failure of neoliberal agricultural reforms in Jamaica, this must first be briefly set in a broader context. While neoliberal advocates emphasize the economy-wide efficiency gains from allowing the market to direct shifts in capital and labour, the reality is that the decline of one sector often produces serious dislocations without concurrent gains elsewhere. This is seen plainly in Jamaica, where the productive economy has collapsed, reflected in a soaring trade deficit, persistently high unemployment and economic stagnation. Between 1980 and 1990, Jamaica's trade deficit nearly quadrupled, growing from US$216m to US$785m, and it has almost tripled again since 1990, with exports now equal to only two-fifths of imports (see Figure 1), impeding Jamaica's ability to reduce its debt (equivalent to 150 per cent of GDP). Given persistent macro-economic imbalances, the government continues to borrow extensively from capital markets.

Figure 1. Jamaica's balance of trade (1970–2000)



Source: Derived from Jamaica's *External Trade Yearbook* (SIOJ).

Figure 2. Jamaica's post-liberalization balance of agricultural trade (1990–2001)



Source: Derived from Jamaica's *External Trade Yearbook* (SIOJ).

Jamaica's *Human Development Report* in 2000 described the country's economic base as being 'fragile, undiversified, and non-competitive' (PIOJ/UNDP 2000, 10). Economic planning continues to prioritize the expansion of tourism, as though it was not fast approaching saturation, while bauxite still provides a significant contribution to Jamaica's exports (albeit with relatively little employment), with a projected lifespan of 40 more years. Manufacturing declined sharply in the 1990s, led by the garment sweatshop sector, which largely fled the island, and the economy was kept afloat only by a dramatic rise in foreign remittances, which outstrip the net earnings of any single domestic economic sector, and revenues from its growing role as a transhipment point in the drug trade. While Jamaica's large agro-trade surpluses had fallen markedly since the 1960s, it was not until the 1990s that growing agro-trade deficits became the norm (see Figure 2); also, agriculture's share of the national workforce continued to shrink over the decade, falling to 22 per cent by the end of the 1990s.

In short, adjustment has not stimulated export competitiveness in Jamaica, but rather has transformed Jamaica into what Witter (2000) calls a 'consuming appendage' of the US economy. Unemployment levels are officially placed in the mid-teens, obscured by loose definitions of employment in the informal sector (that includes a proliferation of petty traders), and are especially high amongst youth and in rural areas. Such shortage of opportunities raises serious social and economic concerns, particularly in the context of vast social inequalities (Weis forthcoming).

The Endangered Agro-Export Sector

The value of Jamaica's food and beverage exports grew significantly between 1991 and 2001 (from US$191m to US$271m), though future prospects dimmed as the pillars of the agro-export base were being eroded during this time.[17] Jamaica's sugar production was increasingly unable to meet local demand while fulfilling export quotas, with significant imports of refined sugar after 1995 (in 2001, the value of sugar exports fell to US$71m, with sugar imports of US$39m), while the legal challenges to the EU-ACP banana regime initiated a sharp drop in Jamaica's banana exports in the 1990s. For both industries, the prospects of becoming competitive are bleak, while most estate and factory workers live in meagre conditions.

Jamaica's sugar industry depends upon preferential markets that guarantee roughly three times the world market price, and looming pressure on these markets through the WTO would likely spell the end of its exports. A breakdown of the various international sugar trade arrangements would move the world market price somewhere between that of preferential markets and the current world market, probably closer to the latter (as some major producers can compete at the world market price, and given the growth of industrial substitutes). This would imply too great an adjustment for Jamaica's sugar industry which remains characterized by underinvestment, heavy indebtedness, outdated factories and equipment, relatively high production costs (exacerbated by livestock damage and security expenses associated with rising lawlessness), inefficient field productivity (e.g. low sugar/hectare ratio, nutrient exhaustion and high pathogen loads), and poor working conditions and labour relations (Ministry of Agriculture 2000).

Despite all this, the Jamaican government has continued focusing the lion's share of its limited agricultural spending on the sugar industry in a desperate hope to re-divest it. Today, government-owned estates are heavily dependent on public funds for survival, with one Jamaican newspaper describing the SCJ as 'sucking government money' (*Gleaner* 2001b) – a continued commitment that undoubtedly reflects the perceived social, economic and political costs that the collapse of sugar would have in the short term. Added to these tangible costs is the fact that plantation control of the best lands represents a large implicit subsidization by small farmers.

Even before the WTO ruled against the EU-ACP banana regime, Jamaican production began to decline with the threat of an adverse judgement. Life supports were promptly thrown out with the help of the EU's Banana Support Programme, which a local politician compared to 'the payoffs the planters got in 1834 when slavery was abolished' (Mills 2000). Regardless of any productivity improvements, Jamaica's Ministry of Agriculture (2000) concedes that 'it will be difficult for us to compete in either price or volume' with Latin American

[17] Trade statistics are derived from the Statistical Institute of Jamaica's *External Trade Yearbook* (various years).

producers, who can produce bigger, brighter and more durable bananas at production costs half those of Jamaican estates.

Coffee exports continued to grow in the 1990s, immune to the precipitous fall in global coffee prices, as Jamaican coffee trades outside of international commodity arrangements (mostly to Japan) with the Blue Mountain variety earning the world's highest prices. Where small farmers have access to the Blue Mountain highlands they have favourable prospects in coffee, but this profitability has brought production under the increasing control of larger growers and foreign (mainly Japanese) capital in chemical-intensive estates. Apart from coffee, most other traditional tree crop exports (cocoa, coconuts, citrus, pimento) have been stagnant or in long-term decline, beset by major disease problems with inadequate research and remedial attention.

Non-traditional agro-exports continued to grow modestly, though the biggest growth – in marijuana – goes unrecorded. With most of the profits made in transit and substantial risks for producers (sporadic raids and flyovers are part of the US 'War on Drugs', though on a much smaller scale than in Latin America), few small farmers cultivate marijuana for more than recreational use.

Liberalization and the Flood of Cheap Food

As Figure 2 illustrates, Jamaica's agro-imports erupted in the 1990s following liberalization. Between 1991 and 2001, Jamaica's total food and beverage imports increased by two-and-a-half times, from US$199m to US$503m. The largest total increase was in cereals, feeds, and animal flesh and products, which account for half the value of Jamaica's agro-imports. While the volume of livestock production in Jamaica expanded significantly (by 19.7 million kg) in the 1990s – primarily in poultry – the volume of livestock imports (41.4 million kg) increased more than twice as quickly. These trends are part of a dramatic dietary shift, as per capita meat consumption increased by 55 per cent between 1980 and 2000 and meat moved to the centre of the diet, even in poor households where it had been relatively rare for most of Jamaican history (Weis 2003).

The 'meatification' of diets reflects Jamaica's transformation into a 'consuming appendage' of the US economy, noted earlier, spurred by the pervasive influence of advertising, television, migratory patterns and tourism, and encapsulated in the rapid growth of fast food chains. A Jamaican Ministry of Agriculture official suggested that these influences are especially strong on the 'young people so caught up with McDonald's, Burger King, and KFC', and are threatening to 'wipe out our culture' as traditional tastes are abandoned. Further, as an NGO representative pointed out, most Jamaican cafeterias and small cook-shops now serve mostly 'two slabs of meat and a heap of rice', with obvious implications for the demand for local produce.

Dietary change has also had a major impact on health. While food insecurity still haunts many poor households, the dominant dietary-epidemiological problem in Jamaica is no longer malnutrition, but rather a marked rise in chronic disease-related health problems: heart disease, obesity, diabetes, hypertension, high blood pressure, stroke and some cancers (Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) 1998; Sinha 1995).[18] Research has linked these trends – typically associated with rich countries – to 'a dietary pattern in which consumption of food from animals, and sugar and salt, has been steadily increasing . . . while consumption of complex carbohydrates, such as fruits, vegetables, roots, tubers, legumes is low or declining' and falls below recommended levels (Sinha 1995, 4).

Jamaica's dietary shift together with rising import competition has had uneven impacts on domestic livestock production. The volume of poultry production increased by 29 per cent in the 1990s, as medium-scale chicken coops spread and a few large factory-farms were established, with increasingly commercialized production of 'layers' and 'broilers' heavily dependent on imported feeds and other inputs (in contrast to the scavenging common fowl). But despite the rapid growth in production, it did not keep pace with demand as poultry imports grew by 43 per cent in the 1990s (Weis 2003).

The biggest impact liberalization has had on livestock production is the overwhelming competition of cheap imports with domestic dairy and beef production. While cattle-rearing has a long history in Jamaica, both on large ranches and by small farmers, liberalization destroyed incentives almost overnight. Dairy imports were first liberalized in the 1980s, but duties were raised when cheap milk solids began out-competing domestic supplies. Dairy products were liberalized again in the early 1990s and the importation of cheap, subsidized milk powder quickly began displacing domestic fresh milk production, which fell by roughly one-third from 1992 to 2000 (Weis 2003). With outlets shrinking and prices dipping below cost of production, one commentator described Jamaica's dairy industry as 'headed for sure collapse' (Clarke 2002). The image of Jamaican dairy farmers pouring away fresh milk they cannot sell has been widely invoked to illustrate the dislocation wrought by liberalization coupled with rich country agricultural subsidies.[19]

With many dairy cows converted into cheap meat, the volume of domestic beef production remained constant in the 1990s, masking the industry's decline as large farms began closing down and stopped enhancing their pastures. Unable to compete with rising beef imports, a representative of a cattlemen's organization stated that: 'Anybody who is in beef cattle right now is [there] because they cannot get out' (Wilson 2002). Many smaller farmers have 'gotten out' by simply letting go of their cattle. Although the competitive pressure on dairy and beef production was predictable, one of its manifestations could hardly have been anticipated by Washington planners: devalued and abandoned, stray cattle have become a growing menace to small farmers, sugar estates and on roads.

[18] By the mid-1990s, evidence suggested that between 25 and 50 per cent of all deaths in the Caribbean were related to heart disease, high blood pressure, diabetes, strokes or cancer, with high levels of premature mortality (age 35–64) (Sinha 1995). A more recent study found that heart problems contribute to one in three deaths in Jamaica (*Gleaner* 2001a).

[19] Featured in the acclaimed documentary, *Life and Debt*, by Stephanie Black, and noted briefly in Joseph Stiglitz's best-selling *Globalization and its Discontents* (Stiglitz 2002, 5). On the documentary see the web site http://www.lifeanddebt.org

Liberalization has also affected Jamaica's fresh produce markets, which, prior to the 1990s, were virtually the sole domain of small farmers. In 1990, fruit and vegetable imports were negligible, and the sub-sector accounted for a significant trade surplus (US$55m). But by the end of the decade, fruit and vegetable imports (mostly from the USA) had overtaken exports, and the domestic production of some crops, such as Irish potatoes, onions and red peas, was largely replaced by imports. Import volumes are as yet relatively small for other directly competitive produce, but are likely to increase.

Interviews with purchasers making decisions between domestic and imported produce provided useful insights into looming market pressures.[20] All noted a dramatic change since the late 1990s, described by the owner of a catering company: 'before importing was not as extensive as it is now – used to be just some fruits, now it's just about everything'. One supermarket purchaser noted how 'every week we order more and more [imports]', while another estimated that over 60 per cent of his produce section was stocked with imports. These trends are spreading to small-scale market vendors from whom most Jamaicans buy their produce, as the owner of a wholesale market explained: 'it's not only the "big boys"' who are importing produce, but '10 to 12 thousand little guys' as 'poor people catch the system'. A Coronation Market vendor described how easy it is: 'dem jus go to de wharf, an buy it from a big crate'.

Most of the purchasers surveyed believe that Jamaican produce has a competitive advantage over imports in terms of quality, consistently describing it as being 'healthier', 'more fresh', having 'less chemicals' and 'much nicer taste-wise'. But this quality advantage is often trumped by concerns with price, inconsistent supply and variable quality. The higher prices and seasonal shortages (and attendant price spikes and drops in quality) of domestic produce were the most common explanations purchasers gave for rising imports. Price was seen to generally override consumer preferences for local produce, as one wholesaler explained: 'you have poor people going to the market and they buy what's cheapest – they can't see where it's from'.

While most of the purchasers expressed an awareness of the impact of rising imports on small farmers (one insisted that 'we need to see them come back in this country . . . if we don't try to work to improve that, we're all dead'), they consistently acknowledged that non-economic allegiance rarely affects buying decisions. One supermarket purchaser stated that 'it is a business after all, and if my competitors are doing it well then I have to too'. Another said bluntly: 'I have no allegiance, it's just who can supply it at the lowest prices . . . Generally what you will find is that most in this sector share my opinion – you have to be competitive, that's all'.

[20] Interviews were conducted with a selected sample of fifteen bulk produce purchasers (wholesalers, grocers, supermarkets, hotels and caterers), primarily in Kingston. Fifteen rapid appraisal-type interviews were also conducted with vendors in Kingston's Coronation Market, the country's largest wholesale market and the focal point of its internal produce distribution system.

The perceived advantages of local production in terms of taste, nutrition and freshness were also tempered by common complaints of poor post-harvest handling, packaging and transport on the part of domestic producers and suppliers, often packing produce in large bags and having to transport it across bumpy roads in pickup trucks, which affects appearance, shelf life and wastage. One supermarket purchaser insisted the 'quality here is better . . . when it comes to nutrition, ours is better, but it doesn't always *look* better', and many contrasted the superior durability and packaging of US produce.

Rising imports are also threatening the domestic agro-processing industry, which has been underdeveloped from the time sugar was first sent to England for refining. Jamaica's rum industry maintains a modest but solid export capacity, accounting for more than half of all beverage exports, while Jamaica's bottling industry has been mostly overtaken by TNCs, with its internationally recognized soda (Ting) and beer (Red Stripe) now foreign-owned trademarks. Canned imports are widely displacing domestic fruit and vegetable processors in supermarkets and small shops; the owner of one of Jamaica's few small-scale processing companies lamented that the 'very, very serious rise in imports' is 'killing us'.

Jamaica's dominant food processor used to source most of its fruit and vegetable inputs domestically, but today 'nearly all [inputs] come from abroad', according to a senior manager, because 'we became very uncompetitive' following liberalization. He noted how the prices of imported food inputs 'kept going down', explaining that 'now we can bring them in much cheaper . . . It's pure economics . . . either we import or we shut down plants, in which case there will be no jobs at all'. In addition to processing, this company also distributes imported TNC products that, as the manager noted, are providing competition in both direct and indirect ways, giving the example of how they are replacing domestic banana chips with imported Pringles and Doritos. The one sizeable agro-processing company to emerge in Jamaica in the 1990s specializes in powdered soy-based food drinks and basic foodstuffs (e.g. tinned mackerel) aimed at low-income consumers, and sources primarily from imported materials.

Most government officials and NGO representatives interviewed described the impacts of liberalization on domestic agriculture in despairing tones. A Rural and Agricultural Development Authority (RADA) official called liberalization 'a great threat to the small farmer's existence . . . we're playing with our life here', and said that while she hopes 'we can stem this flow, I don't know'. An NGO representative insisted that liberalization is 'gonna wipe them out you know – the small farmer is in a lotta trouble', while a trade negotiator described it as 'a disaster, total disaster' and a Ministry of Agriculture official suggested that 'we could see an end to agriculture here'.

Competing Against 'Miami'

It is not the inexorable result of comparative advantage when a Jamaican wholesaler explained that he can fill an order within a week from Miami more cheaply than he could locally, or when the director of a small farmer's cooperative lamented that 'it is very hard to compete with Miami, very hard'. International competitiveness in agriculture is highly distorted, and this is particularly acute in the backyard of the world's leading agro-exporter, the USA, whose subsidy-fortified agricultural sector is the source of more than half of Jamaica's agro-imports.

Although the USA committed itself to reductions in trade-distorting subsidies at the WTO (as they were narrowly defined), it retains a series of supports in this realm, such as export credit guarantees (related to the sale of US$4 billion in exports in 1998) and export promotion programmes (more than US$6 billion in 1999). But the impact of agro-subsidies on competitiveness is greater than appears from looking only at the subsidies defined as trade-distorting, as this WTO distinction is highly artificial. As a Jamaican Ministry of Agriculture official argues, it is not only 'export credits [and] export guarantees . . . if you dig deeper, at things like domestic supports, it still all relates back to competitiveness'. The disparities are encapsulated in the fact that Jamaica's *total* GDP in 2001 was less than 15 per cent of the United States Department of Agriculture's (USDA) budget that year, and the Bush Administration's 2002 US Farm Bill increased agricultural subsidies dramatically.[21]

US direct payments are focused chiefly on large-scale producers of grains and oilseeds, much of which goes to animal feed, connecting the US subsidy regime to Jamaica's rising importation of cheap grains and livestock products (Jamaica's dairy imports are also linked to the EU's enormous subsidies) and the complex issue of dietary shifts. The US PL-480 programme further subsidizes the importation of some basic foodstuffs into Jamaica. While few direct payments go to fruit and vegetable producers in the USA, their production is supported in other ways. To suggest the differential capacities to employ WTO-sanctioned Green Box supports, it is useful to observe the respective sizes of the Jamaican and US agriculture budgets – the former being 0.1 per cent that of the latter in 2000–1, which represents a staggering difference in per farmer public investment of 107 times (US$20,100 to US$187).[22]

These disparities also affect the risks farmers can take. In the USA, large farmers are relatively insulated from investment risks by direct payments, emergency assistance and subsidized insurance and credit, as well as by tax concessions to large farmers for land and machinery investments. In contrast, Jamaica's small farmers face a forbidding investment climate of no support payments, high interest rates and minimal insurance options. The inconsistencies

[21] Incredibly, despite this bill – which it maintains is non-trade distorting – the USA continued campaigning to reduce global tariffs through the WTO, though not surprisingly such hypocrisy contributed to the derailing of the WTO's Cancun Ministerial in 2003.

[22] This is based on an estimate of the population of Jamaica's small farmers of 150,000 (Ministry of Agriculture 2000), and that of full-time farmers in the USA of 960,000 (United States Census Bureau 1999). This crude comparison grossly overstates Jamaica's effective public investment in small farming, as most state support is marked for the estate sector, and understates the difference vis-à-vis the roughly 300,000 largest US farms where the bulk of production and subsidies are concentrated.

of this uneven market discipline become more striking in light of the World Bank's insistence that Jamaica commercialize agricultural credit.

Recent initiatives of the USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) provide a concrete example of how WTO-permissible but highly unequal public subsidies affect competitiveness. The FAS provides US agro-exporters 'with information about market potential; services that put buyers and sellers in touch with each other; help in exhibiting at one of the many FAS-sponsored food trade shows around the world [including a Miami show aimed at Latin American and Caribbean manufacturers, suppliers, distributors, retailers, hotels and restaurants]; and assistance for small firms to find the resources to market their products overseas', strategically integrating its 'marketing, credit, and trade policy tools'. It even uses remote sensing and satellite imagery 'to keep track of the latest developments in crop production around the world', and give 'US producers the most up-to-date, accurate forecasts of their competition' (Galvin 1999).[23] A Jamaican trade negotiator described the Miami-based Caribbean Basin Agricultural Trade Office (CBATO) as 'having more information on our markets than we do'.

The USA has a greater agro-trade surplus with the Caribbean region than it does with Mexico, and its agro-exporting ambitions in the region are evident on CBATO's website (http://www.cbato.fas.usda.gov), which states that: 'our ultimate goal is to increase US exports of food and beverage products to the Caribbean region . . . With more than 18 million land-based tourists, and 23 million permanent residents, the Caribbean islands are quickly becoming a major market for US food and beverage exporters'. The potential to expand US agro-exports to the Caribbean was the subject of the FAS' monthly journal, *AgExporter* in October 2002, which noted that: 'In sending food items to the Caribbean, US companies are in a command position. They are essentially trading 'in their own backyard', and already hold sizeable market shares of all food products sold to the region' (Arias 2002, 4).

In short, as a Jamaican Ministry of Agriculture official pointed out, US agricultural interests are actively planning 'to feed the Caribbean'.

BATTLING IRRELEVANCE: CONCLUSIONS AND WAYS FORWARD

> If we na produce, we jus depend 'pon Omar Davies [Jamaica's Minister of Finance] fi go a Washington an keep gettin' loans. (Small farmer in St. Mary, Jamaica)

Structural adjustment reifies comparative advantage as the normative organizing principle for production, a logic further entrenched by the WTO. The basic assumption is that 'big government' and market regulation cause economic inefficiencies, and that market discipline promotes a better allocation of capital and

[23] This quotation is from a long series of testimonies given during the formulation of the US negotiating position prior to the WTO's Seattle Ministerial in 1999, which remains an outstanding window through which to understand US agricultural trade ambitions and the perspectives of powerful sectoral lobbies.

labour either within economic sectors or by causing them to move to more competitive ones. But the 'level playing field' assumed by advocates of liberalization 'is not level', seen clearly in global agricultural production where immense competitive imbalances in scale, technology, infrastructure, marketing and subsidization allow large producers and TNCs to compete at deflated prices, making small farmers in developing countries 'appear relatively inefficient' (McMichael 2000, 126). Further, the dislocations associated with liberalization cannot be so easily assumed away. While rolling back the state and opening markets are supposed to stimulate competitiveness, the reality is that liberalization often brings dislocating import surges 'without a corresponding (or correspondingly large) surge in exports', causing 'the widening of trade deficits, deterioration in the balance of payments and the continuation or worsening of external debt, which act to constrain growth prospects and often result in persistent stagnation or recession' (Khor 2002, 36).

This outcome is seen clearly in Jamaica where, after two-and-a-half decades of Washington-directed policy reforms, one of the most marked outcomes has been a 'shift from production to trading . . . [in] imported goods' (PIOJ/UNDP 2000, 11). With the decline of the productive economy, including agriculture – which now verges on irrelevance in both export and domestic markets – Jamaica's economy rests on a precarious balance of external migration/remittances, tourism, drugs and borrowing that is layered upon a notoriously high level of inequality. There appears to be no end in sight to its monumental debt service burden, which annually consumes two-thirds of the government budget and starves social investment. That this economic foundation cannot absorb the pools of surplus labour is evident in Kingston's seething slums, the widespread desperation to 'go foreign', and in the youth who sit idle in the countryside, refusing to 'dig dem hand inna de dirt', as old farmers lament (Weis forthcoming).[24]

This paper has assessed how structural adjustment first demobilized the state's role in agricultural development in Jamaica, intensifying historic landscape and institutional inequities, and then induced a wave of cheap food imports in the 1990s that is displacing domestic production at the same time as the plantation sector was imperilled by threats to preferential markets. This experience with neoliberal agricultural restructuring has broader lessons, as many developing countries face a similar array of problems: landscapes that have long stifled small farm development; liberalization with uneven competition; an inability to absorb productively large numbers of superfluous people into new activities (jobless de-peasantization); and the increasing separation of diets from local producers.

Attention has been given not only to the impacts of the restructuring process on agriculture in Jamaica, but to the dogmatic and inconsistent logic underlying it, as it is important to de-construct the theoretical foundations upon which the

[24] Compounding the landed inequities and adverse climate created by adjustment, there are other evolving social dynamics corroding the viability of small farming, such as the decline of cooperation and mutual aid between farmers, the widespread rejection of farming by youth, and the serious problem of crop theft (Weis 2003).

architects of the global economy claim authority. Critical research must not end here though; the theory is not only flawed but the practice is, however powerful, *not* irresistible. And if we truly believe agricultural alternatives are possible, then we must articulate them – a task that is invigorated by growing movements like Via Campesino and eruptions like those at the WTO meeting in Cancun. A key way that agricultural alternatives are being framed is through calls to reclaim food sovereignty as a social, economic and environmental imperative (McMichael 2003), and it is here that attention turns to in the Jamaican context.

To do so, it is first necessary to recognize how a short-sighted view of food security has been strengthened by the increased food availability in Jamaica following liberalization. The *Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions* points out that 'the continued imports of large quantities of food products and single digit inflation has helped to stabilize and/or reduce local food prices' (PIOJ/SIOJ 1998, 21–2), contributing to a marked decline of food and beverages as a ratio of total consumer expenditure over the 1990s, from 54 to 43 per cent and amidst a stagnant economy (PIOJ/SIOJ 2000, 1999). It is in this context that Prime Minister P. J. Patterson (2001) claimed his administration has shown an 'abiding commitment . . . towards food security', despite an exploding agro-trade deficit, enforcing tariffs far below bound levels as imports displace local production, and minimal agricultural programmes concentrated on declining export markets. A RADA official described her sense of the growing strength of the free market approach to food security in Jamaica: 'I hear some very influential people are buying into the argument that food security can be bought with money, or that tourism can pay for food imports . . . saying that farmers can't produce and we should get on with those sectors that can function with efficiency'.

Jamaica's dietary shift towards food products from the First World grain–livestock complex adds an important cultural dimension to the issue of food security. This affects not only the domestic rearing of livestock – overwhelming beef and dairy production, while fostering the growth of a capitalized, import-dependent poultry industry and rising poultry imports – but also the marketability of local produce given the limits of many household food budgets. It bears repeating that while meat consumption has grown so significantly, Jamaica's per capita consumption of fruits, vegetables, roots, tubers and legumes remains below recommended levels. The challenge posed by this dietary change for Jamaica's (and the Caribbean's) agricultural future is described well by Lamming:

> This is not only a matter of agriculture or economics. There is a crisis of the cultural sovereignty of a people when patterns of consumption bear no relation to basic needs and cannot be supported by the productive base of the society. It may sound very strange but a Minister of Agriculture in our region, whether he [*sic*] knows it or not, is engaged in what is essentially a cultural problem: how do you de-colonize the eating habits of a people who have surrendered their very palates to foreign control? . . . Unfortunately for us, there is this enormous separation, between the head and the belly of this society. (1996, 26–7)

In short, in order to contest the logic of liberalization in Jamaica, as in many developing countries – especially in major food deficit ones where consumption patterns have changed – analysis must recognize how immediate political pressures can obscure the roots of food insecurity, agrarian decline and impoverishing urban growth. But while liberalization may bring cheap food for the consuming poor in the short-term, current trends pose serious long-term questions.

One concern is that if local production is lastingly damaged by imports, of which there is a real fear in Jamaica, this could ultimately hurt the consuming poor in the longer term if global regulation ever reduces First World subsidies significantly, which could push up food prices. In this respect, developing nations like Jamaica should be warned by the history of the 'wheat trap', by which import dependencies were generated by aid and concessionary trade, and became increasingly costly over time as they morphed into commercial trade. The free market path to food security and neglect of agriculture's capacity for foreign exchange substitution raises further concerns in light of Jamaica's payments problems, as one small farmer explained: 'Dem gonna have problem you know, dem go foreign an borrow dis big amount a money, an na have no produce to pay it back, so wha gonna happen one a de days, suppose de people dem say dem na gwan lend 'em anymore, how we gonna survive?'

Important social concerns associated with agriculture must also be considered. Despite its decline, agriculture remains a vital sponge for labour in Jamaica, providing more direct employment than any other sector amidst chronically high unemployment levels (PIOJ/SIOJ 2000). A Ministry of Agriculture official suggested that Jamaica 'can't afford to let it [agriculture] die' without facing 'devastating dislocations', while an NGO representative noted that if agriculture continues to decline 'you're looking at unprecedented unemployment'.

The primary destination for rural emigration is Kingston, a city steeped in poverty and violence. The health of agriculture will either help contain or exacerbate this urban malaise. One NGO representative suggested that 'urban poverty and violence are linked to rural poverty and unemployment, while rural employment and health are a direct function of rising imports'. Another NGO representative gave a dark social forecast: '[without agriculture] we might as well forget it, and put on more burglar bars, build more prisons, add more police and security guards . . . and continue living in fear'.

In other words, while it is important to ensure that poor urban consumers have access to affordable food, to accomplish this by sacrificing small farmers will only produce many more poor consumers in the future. One small farmer who travels weekly to Kingston to sell his produce described this plainly: '. . . when I go inna Town [Kingston] to sell, I hear people say to me: "I used to be a country man, I used to do some farming" . . . every man leave de bush man an go an sit on de concrete in Town an beg fi de jobs . . . an now him no where fi go work'.

The connection between the health of agriculture and Jamaica's social fabric must also be understood in the context of tourism. Though the promotion of tourism as Jamaica's primary growth pole raises serious concerns beyond the realm of discussion here, the industry is essential to the Jamaican economy. But in the exuberant projections of how tourism can lead Jamaica's development, its extreme sensitivity to violence, volatility and social decay is often ignored, as are the scenic benefits of a vigorous countryside as tourists travel from their all-inclusive bubbles to various attractions (the 'aesthetic' benefits of agriculture to tourism is something which some Caribbean islands, like Barbados, have explicitly recognized).

Finally, health and nutrition trends add another dimension to the case for supporting small farm production. Noting the regional rise in unhealthy imports and the decline of local food production, both the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO 1998) and the Caribbean Food and Nutrition Institute (Sinha 1995) make health-based appeals for policies that increase domestic fruit and vegetable production and availability and reduce meat consumption.[25] There is little possibility that the rising meat intensity of Jamaican diets can be made less dependent on imports or that intensified meat production holds out the prospect of equity gains given the incredible capitalization of global livestock production. There are also serious environmental concerns associated with efforts to orient agricultural systems towards increasing livestock production (Goodland 1997).

In short, given the distortions, dislocations and unhealthy and unsustainable dietary shifts associated with liberalization, there are many dimensions to a case for market intervention in Jamaica. The argument here is that the Jamaican government should employ agro-tariffs at the upper limit of its WTO commitments, at the very least for all directly competitive produce that has long been grown successfully by Jamaican small farmers and for agro-processed goods for which there is capacity or reasonable potential to produce domestically. It took baby steps in this regard in 2001, raising agro-tariffs to bound levels for a small range of directly competitive goods, the timing of which was linked to the onset of WTO's new tariff valuation system that shrunk the effective impact of tariffs. The government should also consider raising tariffs on some indirectly competitive goods in a way that will make supporting local production economically 'rational', as the current 'rationality' of food choices rests upon extreme distortions.

With tariffs the last line of defence within this extremely distorted global food economy, the current level of tariff flexibility should be defended at future WTO and FTAA negotiations, going beyond current 'soft' definitions of special and

[25] PAHO stated that improved health and nutrition in the region demands greater emphasis on the production and consumption of plant proteins and the 'reduced importation and production of fatty meats' (1998, 200). The CFNI argued that 'in order to address contemporary health problems' in the region, there is an 'urgent need to re-examine Caribbean food availability and dietary patterns', and a 'need to cut down on the amount of meat we eat . . . [and] get more of our protein from plant sources,' which 'would not only increase the much needed and grossly lacking complex carbohydrates but also reduce fat intake' (Sinha 1995, viii, 47, 58). It also emphasized the 'strong health and nutritional importance of consuming adequately our locally grown foods such as fruits, vegetables, ground provisions, and legumes', urging that agricultural policies should incorporate health and nutrition concerns (Sinha 1995, 70).

differential treatment (that give slightly longer periods for implementation) to demand this right in perpetuity in recognition of the unevenness of global agricultural production as well as the social and economic needs bound up in agriculture. Because WTO negotiations have been based on a 'horse trading' system, a great danger for Jamaica and many other developing nations is that tariff barriers are the only measure they have left to negotiate with. Thus, retaining current flexibility in import restraint will involve forging strategic partnerships in trade negotiations with other developing countries that have similar needs to defend rural livelihoods, and one hopes that the seeds of this were sown at the WTO's Cancun Ministerial in 2003. In order to defend tariff flexibility into the future, moving tariff enforcement to bound levels is also an important tactic because advocates of liberalization have commonly sought to use applied tariffs rather than bound commitments as the starting point from which to embark on reductions at trade negotiations.

If Jamaica is to raise agro-tariffs more widely than it did in 2001, and food costs increase in the short-term, there are a variety of ways to mitigate the tensions between small farmer and poor consumer. For instance, a system of subsidized food stamps, allowed under the WTO, could be used to raise the consumption of domestically produced fresh fruit and vegetables in food insecure households, funded in part from the income generated by the increased tariffs on imported food. State-sponsored school feeding programmes, which consist predominantly of chicken and rice and use imported milk powder, are another crucial area where the interests of poor households and small farmers could be mutually supported, with important implications for the formation of dietary patterns. While debt-related budgetary constraints are severe, the government would have more room to manoeuvre if it embraced a longer-term approach to mounting social problems – the current band-aid mode is seen plainly in the fact that the Ministry of Agriculture receives one-twelfth of the budget of the Ministry of National Security.

Although it is argued that enforcing and defending tariffs at bound levels are critical steps, ultimately enhancing Jamaica's food security and ensuring reasonable internal prices will hinge on the possibility of remaking the agricultural landscape to unleash the productive potential of small farmers. In other words, market intervention must not preserve the status quo, but must be seen as a means to support land reform – which will entail overcoming the historical inertia of the plantation sector and the welfare approach to rural poverty. In 2003, the Governor General launched an 'Eat Jamaican' campaign, emphasizing the importance of small farming to Jamaica's heritage, but for agriculture to become a foundation for Jamaica's future rather than a fading relic of its past, there is an urgent need for new ideas and decisive action.

One hundred and sixty years after Emancipation, most small farmers continue to operate on small, steep hillside plots that severely constrain their production options and efficiency. In particular, the lack of irrigation limits the variety and timing of cropping patterns, and steep land gradients and poor infrastructure make labour less efficient, limit mechanized tillage, force more land clearance when soils get exhausted, make it difficult to get produce to the market, and simply increase the arduousness of everyday tasks. In addition to the continued monopoly of the best lands and irrigation supplies by plantations and poorly maintained pastures, another striking feature of Jamaica's rural landscape is the amount of good lands sitting idle, as the area under cultivation fell by roughly one quarter from 1968 to 1996 (SIOJ 1998).

A radical land reform programme aimed at providing small farmers access to the best land, irrigation potential and infrastructure could generate more stable and dignified rural employment. This programme could be promoted, in part, in terms of food security and epidemiological goals to replace rising imports and confront the 'meatification' of diets with enhanced domestic production of fruits and vegetables. But for reasons discussed earlier, Jamaica also desperately needs to develop new export niches in the productive economy.

With threats to preferential markets auguring competitive pressures that will doom Jamaica's traditional agro-export base, and small farmers able to meet domestic demand for sugar and bananas within the current landscape, production of these commodities should be de-prioritized on reformed land (sugar imports have risen because the industry cannot meet export quotas and produce a surplus for the domestic market; if export markets collapse, only a portion of current exports would be needed to satisfy domestic demand). Jamaica's potential for agro-exporting lies not in extensively grown commodities, but rather in diversified production that includes higher value and more labour intensive fruits, vegetables, herbs and 'nutraceuticals' (plants with medicinal properties). With land reform, such production would be poised to tap into rising global demands for 'ethical' and/or organic products, and would benefit from Jamaica's cultural achievements and associated mystique.[26]

In short, land reform could enhance the consistency and competitiveness of domestic fresh produce (recalling the nutrition and taste advantages it is seen to have by purchasers), which would reduce demand for imports and expand the supply of healthy foods, as well as enable the development of new export possibilities. Examining the impacts and deconstructing the illogic of neoliberal reforms can help build hope in such agricultural alternatives, which are surely possible. As one supermarket purchaser pointed out after lamenting the wave of imported food in Jamaica, 'this is still a bountiful island you know!'

REFERENCES

Amin, Samir, 2003. 'World Poverty, Pauperization, and Capital Accumulation'. *Monthly Review*, 55 (5): 1–9.

[26] A large-scale promotion of organic methods would reduce demand for imported seeds, fertilizers and pesticides, but it would also require major investments in research, training and marketing infrastructure (e.g. refrigerated depots). The issues surrounding land reform in Jamaica are developed in more detail in another paper (Weis 2004).

Anderson, Patricia and Michael Witter, 1994. 'Crisis, Adjustment and Social Change: A Case Study of Jamaica'. In *Consequences of Structural Adjustment: A Review of the Jamaican Experience*, ed. Elsie Le Franc, 1–55. Kingston: Canoe.

Arias, A., 2002. 'Tourism Resilient in the Caribbean: Prospects for US Food Exports are Good'. *AgExporter*, 14 (10): 4.

Augustin, Gerard, 1992. 'Project Land Lease 1972–80'. In *Plantation Economy, Land Reform and the Peasantry in a Historical Perspective: Jamaica 1838–1980*, eds Claus Stolberg and Swithin Wilmot, 105–25. Kingston: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Beckford, George L., 1985. 'Caribbean Peasantry in the Confines of the Plantation Mode of Production'. *International Social Science Journal*, 37 (3): 401–14.

Beckford, George L. and Michael Witter, 1991 [1980]. *Small Garden . . . Bitter Weed: The Political Economy of Struggle and Change in Jamaica*. London: Zed.

Berry, R. Albert, 1997. 'Agrarian Reform, Land Distribution, and Small-Farm Policy as Preventive of Humanitarian Emergencies'. Paper presented to The Political Economy of Humanitarian Emergencies Conference, Oxford, July 1997.

Byres, Terence J., 2004a. 'Introduction: Contextualizing and Interrogating the GKI Case for Redistributive Land Reform'. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 4 (1/2): 1–16.

Byres, Terence J., 2004b. 'Neo-Classical Neo-Populism 25 Years On: *Déjà Vu* and *Déjà Passé*. Towards a Critique'. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 4 (1/2): 17–44.

Caribbean Food and Nutrition Institute, 1994. *Household Food Access: A Qualitative Review of the Jamaican Situation*. Kingston: Planning Institute of Jamaica.

Clarke, Patricia, 2002. 'Dairy Farmers Reeling'. *The Jamaica Gleaner*, 4 February: A1, 3.

FAO, 1995. *Assessment of the Effects of Structural Adjustment of the Agricultural Sector: Jamaica*. Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations.

Galvin, T.J., 1999. Statement of the USDA Acting Administrator of the Foreign Agricultural Service before the House Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration and Related Agencies, US House of Representatives, March. Washington: US Government Printing Office.

Gleaner, 2001a. 'Health Woes on the Rise'. *The Jamaica Gleaner*, 18 April: A3.

Gleaner, 2001b. 'Gov't Seeks Loan for Debt Write-off'. *The Jamaica Gleaner*, 5 December: D8.

Goodland, Robert, 1997. 'Environmental Sustainability in Agriculture: Diet Matters'. *Ecological Economics*, 23: 189–200.

Government of Jamaica and National Planning Agency (GoJ/NPA), 1982. *Structural Adjustment of the Jamaican Economy*. Kingston: Government Printing Unit.

Inter-American Development Bank, 1992. *Agricultural Sector Adjustment Programme*. Washington: Inter-American Development Bank.

Khor, Martin, 2002. *Rethinking Globalization: Critical Issues and Policy Choices*. London: Zed.

Lamming, George, 1996. 'Beckford and the Predicaments of Caribbean Culture'. In *The Critical Tradition of Caribbean Political Economy: The Legacy of George Beckford*, eds Kari Levitt and Michael Witter, 19–28. Kingston: Ian Randle.

Lewis, W. Arthur, 1950. *The Industrialisation of the British West Indies*. Port of Spain: Caribbean Commission.

McAfee, Kathy, 1991. *Storm Signals: Structural Adjustment and Development Alternatives in the Caribbean*. Boston: South End.

McBain, Helen, 1992. 'Constraints on the Development of Jamaican Agriculture'. In *Plantation Economy, Land Reform and the Peasantry in a Historical Perspective: Jamaica 1838–1980*, eds Claus Stolberg and Swithin Wilmot, 127–44. Kingston: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

McMichael, Philip, 2000. 'Global Food Politics'. In *Hungry for Profit: The Agribusiness Threat to Farmers, Food, and the Environment*, eds Fred Magdoff, John B. Foster and Frederick H. Buttel, 125–43. New York: Monthly Review.

McMichael, Philip, 2003. 'Food Security and Social Reproduction: Issues and Contradictions'. In *Power, Production and Social Reproduction: Human In/security in the Global Political Economy*, eds Isabella Bakker and Stephen Gill, 169–89. London: Macmillan.

Mills, Claude, 2000. 'Boost for Bananas: $1B EU Support for the Next 5 Years. *The Jamaica Gleaner*, 5 June: A1–A2.

Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), 2000. *Agricultural Production: Medium Term Plan 2000/01–2003/04*. Kingston: Ministry of Agriculture.

Newman, Margaret and Elsie Le Franc, 1994. 'The Small-Farm Sub-Sector: Is There Life After Structural Adjustment'. In *Consequences of Structural Adjustment: A Review of the Jamaican Experience*, ed. Elsie Le Franc, 118–203. Kingston: Canoe.

Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), 1998. *Health in the Americas 1998*, vol. II. Washington: PAHO.

Patterson, P.J., 2001. 'The Prime Minister Speaks on the Importance of Food Security'. *The Jamaica Gleaner*, 4 February: C8.

Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ), 1990. *Jamaica Five-Year Development Plan 1990–1995*. Kingston: PIOJ.

Planning Institute of Jamaica and the Statistical Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ/SIOJ), various years. *Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions*. Kingston: PIOJ.

Planning Institute of Jamaica and the United Nations Development Programme (PIOJ/UNDP), 2000. *Jamaica Human Development Report*. Kingston: PIOJ.

Sinha, D.P., 1995. *Food, Nutrition and Health in the Caribbean: A Time for Re-Examination*. Kingston: CFNI and PAHO.

Statistical Institute of Jamaica (SIOJ), 1998. *Census of Agriculture: An Overview*. Kingston: SIOJ.

Statistical Institute of Jamaica (SIOJ), various years. *External Trade Yearbook*. Kingston: SIOJ.

Stiglitz, Joseph, 2002. *Globalization and its Discontents*. New York: W.W. Norton and Co.

Stone, Carl, 1992. 'The Sugar Co-operatives in Jamaica: 1974–80'. In *Plantation Economy, Land Reform and the Peasantry in a Historical Perspective: Jamaica 1838–1980*, eds Claus Stolberg and Swithin Wilmot, 87–101. Kingston: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Thomas, Clive Y., 1988. *The Poor and the Powerless: Economic Policy and Change in the Caribbean*. New York: Monthly Review.

United States Census Bureau, 1999. *The National Data Book: Statistical Abstract on the US 1999*, 119th edn. Lanham, MD: Bernan.

Webb, S.B., 1997. *Prospects and Challenges for the Caribbean*. Washington: World Bank.

Weis, Tony, 2003. On a Precipice: Globalization and Small Farming in Eastern Jamaica. PhD dissertation, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario.

Weis, Tony, 2004. '(Re-) Making the Case for Land Reform in Jamaica'. *Social and Economic Studies*, forthcoming.

Weis, Tony, forthcoming. 'A Precarious Balance: Neoliberalism, Crisis Management, and the Social Implosion in Jamaica'. *Capital and Class*.

Wilson, Claude, 2002. 'Beef Sector Woes Mount'. *The Jamaica Gleaner*, 26 February: C7.

Witter, Michael, 1989. 'Analysis of Food Assistance Programs in Jamaica'. Kingston: Jamaica Poverty Line Project, Working Paper #1.

Witter, Michael, 2000. 'Consensus and Economic Development in the Caribbean'. Paper for the Annual Conference on Economic Development, Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, October 2000.

World Bank, 1990. *Agricultural Sector Adjustment Loan*. Washington: World Bank Loan #3174.

World Bank, 1993. *Private Sector Development Adjustment Loan*. Washington: World Bank Loan #3622.

World Bank, 1994. *Jamaica: A Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction*. Washington: World Bank.

World Bank, 1996. *Jamaica: Achieving Macro-Stability and Removing Constraints on Growth*. Washington: World Bank.